Outside Blockholders' Monitoring of Management and Debt Financing

Scott Liao

Contemporary Accounting Research, 2015, vol. 32, issue 4, 1373-1404

Abstract: Corporate governance mechanisms designed to alleviate manager†shareholder agency conflicts can worsen shareholder†bondholder conflicts. This study examines how one such corporate governance mechanism, monitoring by large outside shareholders, influences the choice between public and private debt. I conjecture and find that firms with higher outside blockholdings are inclined to choose bank loans over public debt when they borrow, consistent with the notion that banks are better monitors than public debt markets. I also find that bank loans carry less price protection than corporate bonds against increased agency risk associated with outside blocks. Corroborating the monitoring story, I document that bank loans contain more accounting†based covenants and dividend restriction provisions for firms with higher outside blockholdings than for those with lower blockholdings. I find no such relation for public debt covenants. This supports that banks' monitoring of their loans counters the agency risk caused by blockholders. This study extends prior research that associates governance mechanisms with agency costs of debt, by incorporating lenders' differential monitoring mechanisms in the overall corporate governance system.

Date: 2015
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12138

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:coacre:v:32:y:2015:i:4:p:1373-1404

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