Auditors' legal liability, collusion with management, and investors' loss*

Giora Moore and William R. Scott

Contemporary Accounting Research, 1989, vol. 5, issue 2, 754-774

Abstract: Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to model the legal exposure of auditors and to study the extent to which limitations on this exposure affect auditors' chosen audit intensity and collusion with management. Résumé. L'article qui suit a pour but de modéliser les risques auxquels sont exposés les vérificateurs de par la loi et de voir dans quelle mesure les limites de ce risque influent sur l'intensité de la vérification dont décident les vérificateurs et sur la collusion avec la direction.

Date: 1989
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1989.tb00737.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:coacre:v:5:y:1989:i:2:p:754-774

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