Executives' excess compensation, legitimacy, and environmental information disclosure in Chinese heavily polluting companies: The moderating role of media pressure
Qiang Li,
Tian Li,
Hongtao Chen,
Erwei Xiang and
Wenjuan Ruan
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 2019, vol. 26, issue 1, 248-256
Abstract:
This study examines whether executives justify their excess compensation through environmental information disclosure using a sample of listed companies in China's heavily polluting industries from 2010 to 2014. We find that executives' excess compensation is positively related to the quality of environmental information disclosure. The above relationship is significant in cases with strong demand for compensation justification (i.e., state‐owned enterprises and firms where an internal compensation gap is salient), indicating that executives manipulate environmental information disclosure about their companies according to their purposes. We also find that media pressure weakens the above relationship. A further test affirms a differential influence of media pressure in settings that involve public or private ownership, development of markets, and low or high product market competition. This study reveals a self‐serving motive of executives for environmental information disclosure. The findings of this study have practical implications for regulators, shareholders, and managers.
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1676
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:corsem:v:26:y:2019:i:1:p:248-256
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().