Post‐socialist constitutions: The de jure–de facto gap, its effects and determinantsa

Katarzyna Metelska‐Szaniawska
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska

Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, 2021, vol. 29, issue 2, 175-196

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on constitutional rules and their economic effects by extending focus to the de jure–de facto constitutional gap. First, evidence is provided that size of this gap matters as higher gaps lower the effectiveness of the constitutional commitment mechanism. Second, several explanations of this gap are identified, in particular relating to the democratization process, political conflict, age and comprehensiveness of the constitution. The conclusions are based on an empirical study for the unique setting of the post‐socialist countries of Europe and Asia, which all enacted new constitutional frameworks after 1989 and it is shown that in some of these countries constitutions acted as blueprints.

Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/ecot.12261

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Working Paper: Post-Socialist Constitutions: The De Jure - De Facto Gap, Its Effects and Determinants (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:ectrin:v:29:y:2021:i:2:p:175-196

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