 Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full DisclosureJeanne Hagenbach, Frederic Koessler and Eduardo Perez Econometrica, 2014, vol. 82, issue 3, 1093-1131 Abstract: This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information revelation. We consider Bayesian games augmented by a pre‐play communication phase in which announcements are made publicly. We first characterize the augmented games in which there exists a fully revealing sequential equilibrium with extremal beliefs (i.e., any deviation is attributed to a single type of the deviator). Next, we define a class of games for which existence of a fully revealing equilibrium is equivalent to a richness property of the evidence structure. This characterization enables us to provide different sets of sufficient conditions for full information disclosure that encompass and extend all known results in the literature, and are easily applicable. We use these conditions to obtain new insights in games with strategic complementarities, voting with deliberation, and persuasion games with multidimensional types. Date: 2014 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:82:y:2014:i:3:p:1093-1131 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Econometrica is currently edited by Guido W. Imbens More articles in Econometrica from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC. |
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