Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

Johannes Hörner, Satoru Takahashi and Nicolas Vieille ()

Econometrica, 2015, vol. 83, issue 5, 1795-1848

Abstract: This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated, and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The characterization generalizes that for repeated games, reducing the analysis to static Bayesian games with transfers. With independent private values, the restriction to truthful equilibria is without loss, except for the punishment level: if players withhold their information during punishment‐like phases, a folk theorem obtains.

Date: 2015
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Related works:
Working Paper: Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games (2015)
Working Paper: Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games (2014)
Working Paper: Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games (2013)
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