Trading and Information Diffusion in Over‐the‐Counter Markets

Ana Babus and Péter Kondor

Econometrica, 2018, vol. 86, issue 5, 1727-1769

Abstract: We propose a model of trade in over‐the‐counter (OTC) markets in which each dealer with private information can engage in bilateral transactions with other dealers, as determined by her links in a network. Each dealer's strategy is represented as a quantity‐price schedule. We analyze the effect of trade decentralization and adverse selection on information diffusion, expected profits, trading costs, and welfare. Information diffusion through prices is not affected by dealers' strategic trading motives, and there is an informational externality that constrains the informativeness of prices. Trade decentralization can both increase or decrease welfare. A dealer's trading cost is driven by both her own and her counterparties' centrality. Central dealers tend to learn more, trade more at lower costs, and earn higher expected profit.

Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA12043

Related works:
Working Paper: Trading and information diffusion in over-the-counter markets (2018)
Working Paper: Trading and Information Diffusion in Over-the-Counter Markets (2013)
Working Paper: Trading and Information Diffusion in Over-the-Counter Markets (2012)
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