The Political Economy of Zero‐Sum Thinking

S. Nageeb Ali, Maximilian Mihm and Lucas Siga

Econometrica, 2025, vol. 93, issue 1, 41-70

Abstract: This paper offers a strategic rationale for zero‐sum thinking in elections. We show that asymmetric information and distributional considerations together make voters wary of policies supported by others. This force impels a majority of voters to support policies contrary to their preferences and information. Our analysis identifies and interprets a form of “adverse correlation” that is necessary and sufficient for zero‐sum thinking to prevail in equilibrium.

Date: 2025
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