The Social Tax: Redistributive Pressure and Labor Supply

Eliana Carranza, Aletheia Donald, Florian Grosset‐Touba and Supreet Kaur

Econometrica, 2025, vol. 93, issue 6, 2273-2308

Abstract: In low‐income communities in both rich and poor countries, redistributive transfers within kin and social networks are frequent. Such arrangements may distort labor supply—acting as a “social tax” that dampens the incentive to work. We document that across countries, from the United States to Côte d'Ivoire, low‐income groups report strong pressure to share earned income with others; in addition, social groups that undertake more interpersonal transfers work fewer hours. Using a field experiment, we enable piece‐rate factory workers in Côte d'Ivoire to shield income using blocked savings accounts over 9 months. Workers may only deposit earnings increases, relative to baseline, mitigating income effects on labor supply. Offering Private accounts raises work attendance by 6.5% and earnings by 9.4%. These treatment effects are concentrated among workers who report higher redistributive pressure at baseline. To obtain further suggestive evidence on mechanisms, in a supplementary experiment, we vary whether blocked accounts are private or known to the worker's network. When accounts are private, take‐up is substantively higher (60% vs. 14%), with a resultant 8.8% higher earnings. Outgoing transfers do not decline, indicating no loss in redistribution. The welfare benefits of informal redistribution may come at a cost, depressing labor supply and productivity.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21078

Related works:
Working Paper: The Social Tax: Redistributive Pressure and Labor Supply (2025)
Working Paper: The Social Tax: Redistributive Pressure and Labor Supply (2022)
Working Paper: The Social Tax: Redistributive Pressure and Labor Supply (2022)
Working Paper: The Social Tax: Redistributive Pressure and Labor Supply (2022)
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