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Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey

Bernd Hayo () and Stefan Voigt ()

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2014, vol. 11, issue 1, 159-195

Abstract: De jure judicial independence (JI) is the single most important predictor of de facto JI. In this article, we describe under what conditions countries are likely to include JI in their constitutions. We describe and analyze both their original choice in this regard as well as change over time using a newly constructed data set comprised of 100 countries and covering the years between 1950 and 2005. Particularly robust findings are that former British colonies are less likely to address JI explicitly, as are states in the Caribbean. Electoral rules appear to matter and so does the form of government. A higher percentage of urban dwellers reduces the likelihood of mentioning JI in the constitution. Finally, we show that the likelihood that a constitution is altered with regard to JI is quite small: after a period of more than 50 years, 85 percent of all constitutions have remained unchanged in this regard.

Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey (2010) Downloads
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Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:11:y:2014:i:1:p:159-195