Legal Institutions and Social Values: Theory and Evidence from Plea Bargaining Regimes
Yehonatan Givati
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2014, vol. 11, issue 4, 867-893
Abstract:
How do social values shape legal institutions across countries? To address this question I focus on one important legal institution—the use of plea bargaining in criminal cases. I develop a model in which the optimal scope of plea bargaining depends on social values. Specifically, a lower social emphasis on ensuring that innocent individuals are not punished, and a greater social emphasis on ensuring that guilty individuals are punished, lead to a greater use of plea bargaining. Using unique cross‐country data on social preferences for punishing the innocent versus letting the guilty go free, as well as an original coding of plea bargaining regimes across countries, I obtain results that are consistent with the model.
Date: 2014
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12058
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:empleg:v:11:y:2014:i:4:p:867-893
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