Will Divestment from Employment‐Based Health Insurance Save Employers Money? The Case of State and Local Governments

Jeremy D. Goldhaber‐Fiebert, David M. Studdert, Monica S. Farid and Jay Bhattacharya

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2015, vol. 12, issue 3, 343-394

Abstract: Reforms introduced by the Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act (ACA) build new sources of coverage around employment‐based health insurance. But what if firms find it cheaper to have their employees obtain insurance from these sources, even after accounting for penalties (for nonprovision of insurance) and employee bonuses (to ensure the shift is cost neutral for employees)? State and local governments (SLGs) have strong incentives to consider the economics of such “divestment”; many have particularly large unfunded benefits liabilities. We investigated whether SLGs would save under two scenarios: (1) shifting all employees and under‐65 retirees to alternative sources of coverage and (2) shifting only employees whose household incomes indicate they would be eligible for federally‐subsidized coverage and all under‐65 retirees. Full divestment would cost SLGs more than they currently pay, due primarily to penalty costs. Selective divestment could save SLGs nearly $129 billion over 10 years at the expense of the federal government.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:empleg:v:12:y:2015:i:3:p:343-394

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