Does the Chief Justice Make Partisan Appointments to Special Courts and Panels?

Maxwell Palmer

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2016, vol. 13, issue 1, 153-177

Abstract: The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has the exclusive and independent power to appoint federal judges to various special courts and panels, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), the court that oversees all domestic surveillance for national security, including domestic data collection by the National Security Agency (NSA). This article examines the propensity of Chief Justices to appoint co‐partisan judges to these panels. Such appointments may serve to produce decisions and policies that align with the Chief Justice's preferences. I use computational simulations to model the appointment decisions made by Chief Justices. I find that there is less than a 1 percent chance that a neutral Chief Justice would appoint as many Republicans to the FISC as have been appointed in the last 36 years. I further show that the Chief Justice is not selecting appointees on other observable judicial characteristics, such as age, experience, gender, senior status, or caseload. These results have important implications for the creation of judicial institutions, the internal politics of the judiciary, legislative delegation, and the powers and oversight of the national security state.

Date: 2016
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12100

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:empleg:v:13:y:2016:i:1:p:153-177

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