The Global Dominance of European Competition Law Over American Antitrust Law

Anu Bradford, Adam Chilton, Katerina Linos and Alexander Weaver

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2019, vol. 16, issue 4, 731-766

Abstract: The world's biggest consumer markets—the European Union and the United States—have adopted different approaches to regulating competition. This has not only put the European Union and the United States at odds in high‐profile investigations of anticompetitive conduct, but also made them race to spread their regulatory models. Using a novel dataset of competition statutes, we investigate this race to influence the world's regulatory landscape and find that E.U. competition laws have been more widely emulated than the U.S. antitrust laws. We then argue that both “push” and “pull” factors explain the appeal of the E.U. competition regime: the European Union actively promotes its model through preferential trade agreements and has an administrative template that is easy to emulate. As E.U. and U.S. regulators offer competing regulatory models in domains as diverse as privacy, finance, and environmental protection, our study sheds light on how global regulatory races are fought and won.

Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12239

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:empleg:v:16:y:2019:i:4:p:731-766

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Empirical Legal Studies from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().