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Can you trust your lawyer's call? Legal advisers exhibit myside bias resistant to debiasing interventions

Mihael A. Jeklic

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2023, vol. 20, issue 2, 409-433

Abstract: In a vast majority of disputes, settlement is superior to litigation, which involves uncertainty, legal fees, and opportunity cost. Unnecessary litigation also causes judicial backlog, wastes resources, and increases societal conflict. Major contributors to the lack of settlement are intransigent litigants who harbor overoptimistic predictions of litigation outcomes, even though they are looking at identical facts and applicable law. A study (N = 166) found significant myside bias in the participants' predictions of a judicial award (claimants' advisers expected awards that were 69% higher than defendants' advisers) and in their evaluation of arguments (both sides thought the arguments supporting their side were 30% more convincing than the arguments supporting their counterparty). Debiasing interventions—alerting to the myside bias, considering the perspective of the counterparty and dialectical bootstrapping—reduced the bias but did not eliminate it. Exploratory investigation indicated that a large proportion of advisers exhibited naïve realism and bias blind spot, and that cognitive reflection provided a limited measure of resistance to myside bias.

Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12350

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:empleg:v:20:y:2023:i:2:p:409-433

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