EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The Diffusion of Deal Innovations in Complex Contractual Networks

Kristina Bishop, Matthew Jennejohn and Cree Jones

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2025, vol. 22, issue 3, 378-396

Abstract: We introduce a new method for studying contractual evolution in complex markets. We situate the diffusion of a deal innovation within an advisory network and then provide methods for inferring a law firm's preference for adopting the innovation and for calculating each firm's proximity to prior adopters. This allows for granular analysis of firm‐to‐firm interactions as a diffusion mechanism. To demonstrate, we study the top‐up option's diffusion in two‐step tender offers from 1999 to 2013. Diffusion occurs in 40% of observations in which a non‐adopting firm is directly connected to a prior adopter of the option. By contrast, diffusion occurs in only 4% of observations without a direct connection to a prior adopter. We find this relationship persists in even the most comprehensive regression analysis, finding that directly connected firms have a hazard of adoption that is 4.01 times that of firms with no direct connection, even after controlling for deal, firm, and industry characteristics. These results demonstrate the importance of firm‐to‐firm information transfers to contractual evolution and underscore their study as a research priority.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12421

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:empleg:v:22:y:2025:i:3:p:378-396

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Empirical Legal Studies from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-08-06
Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:22:y:2025:i:3:p:378-396