As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political Economy of Judicial Tenure

Albert Yoon

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2005, vol. 2, issue 3, 495-549

Abstract: One interesting feature of the federal judiciary is that Article III judges enjoy lifetime tenure, a unique privilege not shared by members of the federal executive or legislative branches. In addition, judges who serve the requisite years can retire at full salary, guaranteed for life. Yet, the overwhelming majority of judges elect to remain on the bench for, effectively, their entire lives, first as active judges, then as senior judges. Despite the steady increase of both active and senior judges over the past century, little is known about the factors that motivate individuals to become and remain federal judges, even in the absence of financial incentives. Drawing from statistical data provided by the Federal Judicial Center and responses from a fall 2003 survey sent to all senior circuit and district federal court judges, this article describes how institutional and political developments, as well as the onset of aging, influence the capacity in which judges preside on, but not their commitment to, the federal bench. These findings provide insight into the political economy of the federal judiciary, as well as how individuals generally contribute to their respective professions as they grow older.

Date: 2005
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2005.00059.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:empleg:v:2:y:2005:i:3:p:495-549

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