Physician Shopping in Workers' Compensation: Evidence from California

Seth A. Seabury, Robert T. Reville and Frank Neuhauser

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2006, vol. 3, issue 1, 47-77

Abstract: Physician evaluations of impairment severity have a significant impact on the size of permanent disability benefits awarded to injured workers in workers' compensation. This gives both parties in a disputed claim the incentive to “shop” for physicians who will provide them with sympathetic evaluations. In this article we use data from the California workers' compensation system on competing physician evaluations for the same injury to study the extent to which the ability to select a physician results in a more favorable disability rating. We find that disability ratings based on evaluations from physicians selected by the applicant are 23 percent higher than those based on a neutral evaluation, while ratings based on a defense physician's evaluation tend to be about 5 percent lower. Moreover, we match these data to earnings loss data and estimate the extent to which applicant, defense, or neutral ratings best predict the outcomes of injured workers. The neutral ratings appear to do the best job of predicting earnings losses overall, though not by a substantial margin.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2006.00062.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:empleg:v:3:y:2006:i:1:p:47-77

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