Do Noneconomic Damages Caps and Attorney Fee Limits Reduce Access to Justice for Victims of Medical Negligence?

Steven Garber, Michael D. Greenberg, Hilary Rhodes, Xiaohui Zhuo and John L. Adams

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2009, vol. 6, issue 4, 637-686

Abstract: We analyze effects of noneconomic damages caps and attorney fee limits (AFLs) on the ability of people injured by negligent physicians to retain qualified lawyers to represent them. We employ survey data from 965 plaintiffs' attorneys who reported likelihoods of accepting hypothetical meritorious cases described by scenarios. We estimate how willingness to accept such cases increases with the expected hourly fees associated with them, and the estimates suggest substantial effects and plausible tradeoffs. We conclude that caps and AFLs make it harder to retain counsel in various circumstances, and we present policy simulations elucidating how several factors combine to determine these effects.

Date: 2009
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2009.01156.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:empleg:v:6:y:2009:i:4:p:637-686

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Empirical Legal Studies from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().