Is Pleading Really a Bargain?
David Abrams ()
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2011, vol. 8, issue s1, 200-221
Abstract:
A criminal defendant's decision of whether to accept a plea bargain is one with serious consequences both for his or her immediate and long‐term future. Conventional wisdom suggests that defendants are better served by entering into a plea bargain, to avoid what is known as the “trial penalty.” In this article I present evidence that this notion is likely mistaken. In OLS regressions using data from Cook County state courts, I find that a risk‐neutral defendant seeking to minimize his or her expected sentence would do substantially better by rejecting a plea bargain. I also employ an IV approach to the question and, while the instrument is weak, the results are consistent with the OLS: defendants are better off going to trial.
Date: 2011
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2011.01234.x
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:empleg:v:8:y:2011:i:s1:p:200-221
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