On the Role of Regulatory Banking Capital

Harald Benink, Jón Daníelsson and Ásgeir Jónsson

Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 2008, vol. 17, issue 1, 85-96

Abstract: In this paper the authors study the role of regulatory banking capital and analyze the incentive effects of the Basel II Accord. They argue that Basel II may become a source of systemic risk due to endogenous risk and the risk sensitivity of the capital requirements. In this context they note that financial instability may enter via the asset side of the banks' balance sheets when banks are forced to sell assets in order to maintain the capital buffer prescribed by Basel II.

Date: 2008
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0416.2007.00134.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:finmar:v:17:y:2008:i:1:p:85-96

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