 Option Expensing and Managerial Equity IncentivesYi Feng and Yisong S. Tian Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 2009, vol. 18, issue 3, 195-241 Abstract: We examine the impact of mandatory option expensing on managerial equity incentives. Though effective only after June 15, 2005, there is evidence that U.S. firms begin preparing for option expensing as early as 2002 by making changes to their equity incentive plans. We find that (1) CEO option incentives exhibit a sharp reversal during the period 1993‐2005, with the median CEO option incentives increasing 25% a year before 2002 but declining 17% a year after 2001; (2) the reduction in option incentives after 2001 is larger for firms that use excessive levels of equity incentives prior to 2002; (3) firms make similar reductions to options granted to CEOs, other top executives and lower‐level employees; (4) CEO stock incentives increase throughout the entire 13‐year period, rising at an even greater rate after 2001; and (5) the increase in stock incentives after 2001 is far from offsetting the corresponding decrease in option incentives. These findings are robust to controls for firm and CEO characteristics and for concurrent regulatory, business and market events such as the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002, the option backdating scandal, and the 2000 stock market crash. We also provide a theoretical explanation for the documented changes in option incentives. Date: 2009 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:finmar:v:18:y:2009:i:3:p:195-241 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments from John Wiley & Sons |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.