Do high‐centrality CEOs influence audit outcomes?

Mohamad Mazboudi, Salim Chahine, Yiwei Fang and Mingying Cheng

Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 2025, vol. 34, issue 1, 3-38

Abstract: Using insights from the social network theory which posits that individuals with high network centrality have influence and power within their social networks, we argue that CEO network centrality increases the CEO bargaining power in audit fee negotiations. We find that audit fees are lower in firms managed by CEOs with high network centrality. We also find that high‐centrality CEOs do not negotiate audit fees at the expense of lower‐quality audit services. We further document the influence high‐centrality CEOs have on the audit decisions of their social peers within the network. For example, we show that less central (i.e., peripheral) CEOs are likely to hire auditors that do work for firms with CEOs enjoying high levels of network centrality. Together our findings suggest that high network centrality reflects a bargaining power CEOs can use to lower their audit fees.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/fmii.12208

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:finmar:v:34:y:2025:i:1:p:3-38

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