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Managed care and shadow price

Ching-to Ma ()

Health Economics, 2004, vol. 13, issue 2, 199-202

Abstract: A managed-care company must decide on allocating resources of many services to many groups of enrollees. The profit-maximizing allocation rule is characterized. For each group, the marginal utilities across all services are equalized. The equilibrium has an enrollee group shadow price interpretation. The equilibrium spending allocation can be implemented by letting utilitarian physicians decide on service spending on an enrollee group subject to a budget for the group. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:13:y:2004:i:2:p:199-202