Does Physician Dispensing Increase Drug Expenditures? Empirical Evidence from Switzerland

Boris Kaiser and Christian Schmid

Health Economics, 2016, vol. 25, issue 1, 71-90

Abstract: This paper analyzes whether the opportunity for physicians to dispense drugs increases healthcare expenditures. We study the case of Switzerland, where dispensing physicians face financial incentives to overprescribe and sell more expensive pharmaceuticals. Using comprehensive physician‐level data, we exploit the regional variation in the dispensing regime to estimate causal effects. The empirical strategy consists of a doubly‐robust estimation that combines inverse probability weighting with regression. Our main finding suggests that dispensing leads to higher drug costs on the order of 34% per patient. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2016
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https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3124

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:25:y:2016:i:1:p:71-90

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