Financial Incentives, Targeting, and Utilization of Child Health Services: Experimental Evidence from Zambia

Günther Fink and Peter C. Rockers

Health Economics, 2017, vol. 26, issue 10, 1307-1321

Abstract: To address untreated infections in children, routine health checkups have increasingly been incentivized as part of conditional cash transfer programs targeted at the poor. We conducted a field experiment in Zambia to assess the elasticity of demand for checkups as well as the associated health benefits. We find that relatively small incentives induce substantial increases in uptake among non‐farming households and households living farther away from clinics, but not among households in the top wealth quintile. These results suggest that small financial incentives may be an efficient way to target poor populations. However, given the weak socioeconomic gradient in infections observed, small incentives will miss a substantial fraction of exposed children. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:26:y:2017:i:10:p:1307-1321

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