Medical Malpractice Damage Caps and Provider Reimbursement

Andrew Friedson

Health Economics, 2017, vol. 26, issue 1, 118-135

Abstract: A common state legislative maneuver to combat rising healthcare costs is to reform the tort system by implementing caps on noneconomic damages awardable in medical malpractice cases. Using the implementation of caps in several states and large database of private insurance claims, I estimate the effect of damage caps on the amount providers charge to insurance companies as well as the amount that insurance companies reimburse providers for medical services. The amount providers charge insurers is unresponsive to tort reform, but the amount that insurers reimburse providers decreases for some procedures. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:26:y:2017:i:1:p:118-135

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