The optimal design of assisted reproductive technologies policies
Marie‐Louise Leroux,
Pierre Pestieau and
Gregory Ponthiere
Health Economics, 2024, vol. 33, issue 7, 1454-1479
Abstract:
This paper studies the optimal fiscal treatment of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in an economy where individuals differ in their reproductive capacity (or fecundity) and in their wage. We find that the optimal ART tax policy varies with the postulated social welfare criterion. Utilitarianism redistributes only between individuals with unequal fecundity and wages but not between parents and childless individuals. To the opposite, ex post egalitarianism (which gives absolute priority to the worst‐off in realized terms) redistributes from individuals with children toward those without children, and from individuals with high fecundity toward those with low fecundity, so as to compensate for both the monetary cost of ART and the disutility from involuntary childlessness resulting from unsuccessful ART investments. Under asymmetric information and in order to solve for the incentive problem, utilitarianism recommends to either tax or subsidize ART investments of low‐fecundity‐low‐productivity individuals at the margin, depending on the degree of complementarity between fecundity and ART in the fertility technology. On the opposite, ex post egalitarianism always recommends marginal taxation of ART.
Date: 2024
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https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4822
Related works:
Working Paper: The Optimal Design of Assisted Reproductive Technologies Policies (2022) 
Working Paper: The optimal design of assisted reproductive technologies policies (2022) 
Working Paper: The optimal design of assisted reproductive technologies policies (2022) 
Working Paper: The optimal design of assisted reproductive technologies policies (2022) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:33:y:2024:i:7:p:1454-1479
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