Healthcare Quality by Specialists Under a Mixed Compensation System: An Empirical Analysis

Damien Echevin, Bernard Fortin and Aristide Houndetoungan

Health Economics, 2025, vol. 34, issue 5, 972-991

Abstract: We analyze the effects of a mixed compensation (MC) scheme for specialists on the quality of their healthcare services. We exploit a reform implemented in Quebec (Canada) in 1999. The government introduced a payment mechanism combining a per diem with a reduced fee per clinical service. Using a large patient/physician panel dataset, we estimate a multi‐state multi‐spell hazard model analogous to a difference‐in‐differences approach. We compute quality indicators from our model. Our results suggest that the reform reduced the quality of MC specialist services measured by the risk of rehospitalization and mortality after discharge.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4943

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:34:y:2025:i:5:p:972-991

Access Statistics for this article

Health Economics is currently edited by Alan Maynard, John Hutton and Andrew Jones

More articles in Health Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().