Solo versus group practice in the medical profession: The influence of malpractice risk

W. David Bradford

Health Economics, 1995, vol. 4, issue 2, 95-112

Abstract: While Partnerships are a significant form of business organization in many sectors of the economy, relatively little is known about the incentives which lead to their formation. This paper explores the formation of partnerships among office based physicians when facing some risk of malpractice litigation. Theoretical results indicate that malpractice exposure can increase the incentives to shirk within a partnership, and so exert a significant influence on the decision to form a partnership. Empirical results find that malpractice risk has the expected negative effect on some partnership formation.

Date: 1995
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https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4730040203

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:4:y:1995:i:2:p:95-112

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