Values and preferences are not necessarily the same

Alan Shiell, Penelope Hawe and Janelle Seymour

Health Economics, 1997, vol. 6, issue 5, 515-518

Abstract: Economic theory typically draws no distinction between preferences and values, assumes that preferences are stable and complete and that all that need be done to elicit them is to ask the right question in the right way. It is argued here that values for some fundamental aspects of life, such as health, are not the same as preferences. The former are less differentiated and require construction and clarification before they can be elicited. The implications of this for health state valuation are discussed. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 1997
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1050(199709)6:53.0.CO;2-N

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:6:y:1997:i:5:p:515-518

Access Statistics for this article

Health Economics is currently edited by Alan Maynard, John Hutton and Andrew Jones

More articles in Health Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().