Demand inducement as cheap talk

Paul Calcott

Health Economics, 1999, vol. 8, issue 8, 721-733

Abstract: The doctor–patient interaction is analysed in a game of cheap talk. Causes and consequences of imperfect agency are examined. One form of imperfect agency, supplier‐induced demand, is a feature of neologism proof equilibria with some parameter values but not with others. The model is used to evaluate two tests that have been used to test for the existence of supplier‐induced demand. The analysis suggests that the two tests, which compare the medical utilization of informed and uninformed consumers, are not valid. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1050(199912)8:83.0.CO;2-A

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:8:y:1999:i:8:p:721-733

Access Statistics for this article

Health Economics is currently edited by Alan Maynard, John Hutton and Andrew Jones

More articles in Health Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().