 WHEN DOES DETERMINACY IMPLY EXPECTATIONAL STABILITY?James Bullard and Stefano Eusepi International Economic Review, 2014, vol. 55, issue 1, 1-22 Abstract: Since the introduction of rational expectations, there have been issues with multiple equilibria and equilibrium selection. We study the connections between determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium and learnability of that equilibrium in a general class of purely forward‐looking models. Our framework is sufficiently flexible to encompass lags in agents' information and either finite horizon or infinite horizon approaches to learning. We are able to isolate conditions under which determinacy does and does not imply learnability and also conditions under which long‐horizon forecasts make a clear difference for learnability. Finally, we apply our result to a relatively general New Keynesian model. Date: 2014 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:55:y:2014:i:1:p:1-22 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article International Economic Review is currently edited by Michael O'Riordan and Dirk Krueger More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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