EFFICIENT LARGE‐SIZE COORDINATION VIA VOLUNTARY GROUP FORMATION: AN EXPERIMENT
Chun‐Lei Yang,
Mao‐Long Xu,
Juanjuan Meng and
Fang‐Fang Tang
International Economic Review, 2017, vol. 58, issue 2, 651-668
Abstract:
Efficient coordination in large groups is a fundamental issue in economic organizations. We consider the weak‐link game with the feature of economies of scale that is necessary for voluntary group growth, in a minimal setup with exit and merger options. We show that large groups with efficient outcomes prevail in most communities. Seed groups form that seem to set a norm of both maximal effort level and mutual trust that there will be no panic when seeing noisy dips. Initial doubters are eventually converted into norm abiders. A restart further speeds up the process of coordination success.
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12230
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:58:y:2017:i:2:p:651-668
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598
Access Statistics for this article
International Economic Review is currently edited by Michael O'Riordan and Dirk Krueger
More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().