WORK INCENTIVES OF MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES AND THE ROLE OF ASSET TESTING

Svetlana Pashchenko and Ponpoje Porapakkarm

International Economic Review, 2017, vol. 58, issue 4, 1117-1154

Abstract: Should asset testing be used in means†tested programs? Focusing on Medicaid, we show that in the asymmetric information environment, there is a positive role for asset testing. Our tool is a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. We find that 23% of Medicaid enrollees do not work in order to be eligible. These distortions are costly: If Medicaid eligibility could be linked to (unobservable) productivity, this results in substantial welfare gains. We show that asset testing can achieve a similar outcome when asset limits are allowed to be different for workers and nonworkers.

Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12247

Related works:
Working Paper: Work Incentives of Medicaid Beneficiaries and the Role of Asset Testing (2016)
Working Paper: Work Incentives of Medicaid Beneficiaries and The Role of Asset Testing (2016)
Working Paper: Work Incentives of Medicaid Beneficiaries and The Role of Asset Testing (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:58:y:2017:i:4:p:1117-1154

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Review is currently edited by Michael O'Riordan and Dirk Krueger

More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().