ON STRATEGY†PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE†PEAKEDNESS

Shurojit Chatterji and Jordi Massó
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jordi Masso

International Economic Review, 2018, vol. 59, issue 1, 163-189

Abstract: We consider strategy†proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops†onlyness, anonymity, and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single†peakedness (referred to as semilattice single†peakedness). We do so by deriving from the rule an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the concept of a semilattice single†peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well†known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy†proof rules are admissible are semilattice single†peaked domains.

Date: 2018
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