TRADE DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENT
Giovanni Maggi and
Robert Staiger ()
International Economic Review, 2018, vol. 59, issue 1, 19-50
We develop a model of trade agreements with renegotiation and imperfectly verifiable information. In equilibrium, trade disputes can occur and can be resolved in a variety of ways: Governments may settle â€œearlyâ€ or trigger a court ruling, and in the latter case, they may implement the ruling or reach a postâ€ ruling settlement. The model yields predictions on how the dispute outcome depends on the contracting environment and how it correlates with the optimal contract form. We find support for a key prediction of our model using data on the outcomes of actual trade disputes in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:59:y:2018:i:1:p:19-50
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598
Access Statistics for this article
International Economic Review is currently edited by Harold L. Cole
More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().