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SINGLE MOMS AND DEADBEAT DADS: THE ROLE OF EARNINGS, MARRIAGE MARKET CONDITIONS, AND PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY

Andrew Beauchamp, Geoffrey Sanzenbacher, Shannon Seitz and Meghan Skira

International Economic Review, 2018, vol. 59, issue 1, 191-232

Abstract: Why do some men father children outside of marriage without providing support? Why do some women have children outside of marriage when they receive little support from fathers? Why is this behavior more common among Blacks than Whites? We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of marriage, employment, fertility, and child support decisions. We consider the extent to which low earnings, marriage market conditions, and preference heterogeneity explain nonmarital childbearing, deadbeat fatherhood, and racial differences in these outcomes. We find the Black–White earnings gap and preference heterogeneity explain a substantial portion of racial differences, whereas marriage market conditions are less important.

Date: 2018
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https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12267

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International Economic Review is currently edited by Michael O'Riordan and Dirk Krueger

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