LEARNING MATTERS: REAPPRAISING OBJECT ALLOCATION RULES WHEN AGENTS STRATEGICALLY INVESTIGATE

Patrick Harless and Vikram Manjunath

International Economic Review, 2018, vol. 59, issue 2, 557-592

Abstract: Individuals form preferences through search, interviews, discussion, and investigation. In a stylized object allocation model, we characterize the equilibrium learning strategies induced by different allocation rules and trace their welfare consequences. Our analysis reveals that top trading cycles rules dominate serial priority rules under inequality†averse measures of social welfare.

Date: 2018
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