EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF UNCERTAINTY IN COORDINATION GAMES

Christos Ioannou and Miltiadis Makris

International Economic Review, 2019, vol. 60, issue 2, 751-799

Abstract: Global games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in Common Knowledge Coordination games. The present study investigates in a controlled setup, using as controls Common Knowledge games, whether idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals (Global games) or uncertainty about the number of actual players (Poisson games) may influence subjects' behavior. We find that uncertainty about the number of actual players has more influence on subjects' behavior than idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals. Furthermore, subjects' behavior under Poisson population‐size uncertainty is closer to the respective theoretical prediction than subjects' behavior under idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12367

Related works:
Working Paper: An Experimental Study Of Uncertainty In Coordination Games (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: An Experimental Study Of Uncertainty In Coordination Games (2019) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:60:y:2019:i:2:p:751-799

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Review is currently edited by Michael O'Riordan and Dirk Krueger

More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:60:y:2019:i:2:p:751-799