EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

SOCIAL INSURANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

German Cubas () and Pedro Silos

International Economic Review, 2020, vol. 61, issue 1, 219-240

Abstract: This article studies how insurance from progressive taxation improves the matching of workers to occupations. We propose an equilibrium dynamic assignment model to illustrate how social insurance encourages mobility. Workers experiment to find their best occupational fit in a process filled with uncertainty. Risk aversion and limited earnings insurance induce workers to remain in unfitting occupations. We estimate the model using microdata from the United States and Germany. Higher earnings uncertainty explains the U.S. higher mobility rate. When workers in the United States enjoy Germany's higher progressivity, mobility rises. Output and welfare gains are large.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12422

Related works:
Working Paper: Social Insurance and Occupational Mobility (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Social Insurance and Occupational Mobility (2017) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:61:y:2020:i:1:p:219-240

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Review is currently edited by Michael O'Riordan and Dirk Krueger

More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:61:y:2020:i:1:p:219-240