DECENTRALIZED ONE‐TO‐MANY BARGAINING

Chiu Yu Ko and Duozhe Li

International Economic Review, 2020, vol. 61, issue 3, 1139-1172

Abstract: We study a one‐to‐many bargaining model in which one active player bargains with every passive player on how to share the surplus of a joint project. The order of bargaining is not fixed and the active player decides whom to bargain with in each period. Our model admits a rich set of equilibria and we identify the upper and lower bounds of equilibrium payoffs. We also examine whether two natural ordering protocols often assumed in existing studies can sustain endogenously. Although the queuing protocol may indeed arise in an equilibrium, the rotating protocol is in general not self‐enforcing.

Date: 2020
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