MULTI‐AGENT PERSUASION: LEVERAGING STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY

Tetsuya Hoshino

International Economic Review, 2022, vol. 63, issue 2, 755-776

Abstract: A principal wishes to persuade multiple agents to take a particular action profile. Each agent cares about both a payoff‐relevant state and other agents' actions. The principal discloses information about the state to control the agents' behavior by using their strategic uncertainty. We show that for any nondegenerate prior, the principal can persuade the agents to take an action profile as a unique rationalizable outcome if that action profile satisfies a generalization of risk dominance. Moreover, this result remains true even if each of the agents is allowed to strategically choose whether to receive information from the principal or not.

Date: 2022
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