ADVERSE SELECTION, LEARNING, AND COMPETITIVE SEARCH

Karin Mayr‐Dorn

International Economic Review, 2023, vol. 64, issue 1, 129-153

Abstract: I develop a model that allows for an analysis of the effects of time on adverse selection in the presence of search frictions. I find that, as a firm takes longer to adjust a worker's contract in response to learning about his type, inefficient overwork during the time before wage adjustment (probation) decreases. This provides a rationale for an optimal (minimum) probation period of about one month in the baseline scenario. Optimal probation duration varies with the degree of search frictions, the cost of effort, the relative productivity of different types of workers, and minimum wage regulations.

Date: 2023
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