GAMING A SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS SYSTEM

Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen

International Economic Review, 2023, vol. 64, issue 1, 413-443

Abstract: A university uses both early‐stage selection outcome (high‐school affiliation) and late‐stage admission test outcome (standardized test scores) to select students. We use this model to study policies that have been proposed to combat inefficient gaming in college admissions. Increasing university enrollment size can exacerbate gaming and worsen the selection outcome. Abolishing standardized tests for university admissions increases gaming targeting high‐school admissions and worsens the selection outcome, whereas eliminating high‐school ability sorting may improve the university selection outcome under some cost conditions of gaming. Committing to a lower‐powered selection scheme can improve the selection outcome by reducing gaming behaviors.

Date: 2023
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