ON THE ECONOMIC MECHANICS OF WARFARE

Guillaume Vandenbroucke

International Economic Review, 2025, vol. 66, issue 2, 491-526

Abstract: How do war‐related expenditures affect economically relevant outcomes at a war's conclusion (e.g., prevailing side, duration, and casualties)? I present a model of attrition and characterize the effects of resources at a military conclusion (one side cannot fight anymore) and a political conclusion (one side quits). I analyze the Pacific War through the lenses of the model, both theoretically and empirically. I find that a parsimonious parameterization reproduces the aggregate patterns of destruction, measured in ship tonnage, for both belligerents.

Date: 2025
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