ON THE ECONOMIC MECHANICS OF WARFARE
Guillaume Vandenbroucke
International Economic Review, 2025, vol. 66, issue 2, 491-526
Abstract:
How do war‐related expenditures affect economically relevant outcomes at a war's conclusion (e.g., prevailing side, duration, and casualties)? I present a model of attrition and characterize the effects of resources at a military conclusion (one side cannot fight anymore) and a political conclusion (one side quits). I analyze the Pacific War through the lenses of the model, both theoretically and empirically. I find that a parsimonious parameterization reproduces the aggregate patterns of destruction, measured in ship tonnage, for both belligerents.
Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12740
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:66:y:2025:i:2:p:491-526
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