BANKING AND BANKING REFORMS IN CHINA IN A MODEL OF COSTLY STATE VERIFICATION
Jie Luo and
Cheng Wang
International Economic Review, 2025, vol. 66, issue 2, 849-882
Abstract:
We present a macro view of China's financial system where a monopolistic banking sector coexists endogenously with bonds and private loans. In equilibrium smaller firms raise finance from private lending, larger firms through bank loans, and the largest by issuing bonds. The model predicts that expanding credit supply increases bank loans but reduces bond finance and private lending, in absolute terms and relative to total credit. In addition, removing the interest rate ceiling on bank lending—a recent reform in China—induces larger loans and higher lending rates, lowering the share of bank loans in total credit. Empirical evidence is presented to support these predictions.
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12744
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:66:y:2025:i:2:p:849-882
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598
Access Statistics for this article
International Economic Review is currently edited by Michael O'Riordan and Dirk Krueger
More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().