Financial Crises and the Dismissal of Central Bank Governors: New Evidence
I Kadek Dian Artha and
International Journal of Finance & Economics, 2015, vol. 20, issue 1, 80-95
This paper examines whether financial crises affect the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. Employing a conditional fixed effects logit model for 101 countries during the period 1970–2007, we find that financial crises significantly increase the likelihood of a central bank governor turnover. When we decompose crises into banking, currency, and debt crises we find that banking crises and debt crises significantly increase the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. Our results also suggest that financial crises increase the probability that a non‐government ally will be appointed as new central bank governor. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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