Does lobbying of firms complement executive networks in determining executive compensation?

Monomita Nandy, Suman Lodh, Jin Wang and Jaskaran Kaur

International Journal of Finance & Economics, 2021, vol. 26, issue 3, 4137-4162

Abstract: In this paper we predict and find that the lobbying activities of firms can complement executive networks in determining executive compensation. Firms of all sizes, after considering market competition as a governance mechanism, prefer to consider lobbying as a means of networking along with executive level networking to determine executive compensation. The empirical implication of the study provides guidance to scholars who should consider lobbying along with executive networks in determining executive compensation. The composite theoretical underpinning and the importance of information flow through lobbying activities of firms will be an important insight for policy makers involved in determining executive compensation.

Date: 2021
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