EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Directors' and officers' liability insurance and minority shareholders' participation in corporate governance

Ruigang Zhang, Runze Yang and Hanwen Huo

International Journal of Finance & Economics, 2025, vol. 30, issue 2, 1106-1123

Abstract: This study empirically investigates the influence of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on minority shareholders' participation in corporate governance. Using a sample from Chinese A‐share listed companies between 2011 and 2018, we find that D&O insurance can significantly decrease the participation of minority shareholders, and this conclusion remains valid after robustness checks. The mechanism analysis demonstrates that D&O insurance plays a positive role in diminishing minority shareholders' participation through the enhancement of firm performance. Further analyses suggest that the negative association between D&O insurance and minority shareholders' participation is more pronounced in firms with weaker corporate governance practices. These findings provide evidence for the supervisory governance role of D&O insurance, suggesting China should consider encouraging listed companies to purchase D&O insurance for the protection of minority shareholders.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.2961

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:ijfiec:v:30:y:2025:i:2:p:1106-1123

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://jws-edcv.wile ... PRINT_ISSN=1076-9307

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Finance & Economics is currently edited by Mark P. Taylor, Keith Cuthbertson and Michael P. Dooley

More articles in International Journal of Finance & Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-17
Handle: RePEc:wly:ijfiec:v:30:y:2025:i:2:p:1106-1123